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by Mark Weinstein
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1848901003. US$ 17.00

Review by G.C. GODDU
Department of Philosophy
University of Richmond
28 Westshampton Way
Richmond, VA 23137
U.S.A.
ggoddu@richmond.edu
Mark Weinstein’s, Logic, Truth and Inquiry is an ambitious and
provocative case for a theory of truth and warrant strength that will
undergird an “account of argument in the broad sense of current
argumentation theory” (p. 12). I begin with a very schematic
synopsis of Weinstein’s rich discussion through his six chapters.
Weinstein himself notes that his arguments are “frequently
presented in broad outline” (p. 1), so my quick sketch will be even
broader. I conclude with some brief observations about both what
the book leaves unresolved and the merits of Weinstein’s intriguing
book.
1. Synopsis
In the first chapter, Weinstein frames the challenge of providing an
adequate account of truth for argumentation theory. According to
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Weinstein, despite recognition of the importance of context (and
audience), informal logicians and argumentation theorists still tend
to adhere to a basic logic that is underpinned by a correspondence
theory of truth. But, “ordinary argumentation most often deals with
issues for which a corresponding reality is none too clear” (p. 7).
One consequence, says Weinstein, has been a shift away from truth
toward acceptability within the theory of argument evaluation. But
Weinstein wants to resist this shift since “no mater how construed
or qualified, acceptability still remains vulnerable to the question:
It is (e.g., rationally) acceptable, but is it true …?” (p. 9). But if not
correspondence or acceptability, “whence the epistemic adequacy
of arguments?” (p. 15). Weinstein considers James Freeman’s
commonsense foundationalism, which locates the epistemic
adequacy in the generation of acceptable premises via reliable
belief generating mechanisms, but rejects it on the grounds that at
best this is only the beginning of the story, for the reliability of the
mechanisms can only be judged against the backdrop of critical
inquiry. Next, Weinstein considers Robert Pinto’s appeal to
“critical practice,” which Weinstein, in at least broad outline,
accepts. But Weinstein eschews Pinto’s (and most of informal
logic’s) prevalent focus on “ordinary argumentation” and instead
proposes scientific inquiry as “more appropriate as an
epistemological paradigm of successful critical practice than the
procedures of commonsense solutions to everyday problems” (p.
35).
Weinstein turns from his discussion of the adequacy of
premises in the first chapter to a discussion of the adequacy of
inferences in Chapter 2. In particular, Weinstein is interested in
grounding a theory of entailment adequate for argumentation
theory as he conceives it. Hence, in the first section of the chapter,
Weinstein runs through a quick exploration of deductive validity,
Carnap’s meaning postulates, Harvey Siegel’s fallibilist
foundationalism, Trudy Govier’s discussion of argument
reconstruction, and Stephen Toulmin’s warrants. In the second
section of the chapter, Weinstein proposes and defends modeling
Toulmin’s warrants not in terms of a metamathematical model
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based on arithmetic, but rather one based on scientific inquiry. The
hope is to avoid Siegel’s worries about relativism while avoiding
the narrow applicability of deductive validity as a standard. The
upshot of Chapter 2 is that the adequacy of inferences will be based
on the warrants backing them, so argumentation theory needs a
theory of the adequacy of warrants. That is the general project of
Chapter 3.
Weinstein begins Chapter 3 with a discussion of Putnam’s
internal realist take on truth, in which truth is not external to our
theorizing, but grows within it (p. 75). Unfortunately, like many in
argumentation theory, Putnam resorts to an ideal epistemic
community to try to avoid relativism. But “without some sense of
what warrants the standards to which such an ideal community
would appeal truth collapses into acceptability” (p. 76). Weinstein
instead recommends trying to capture Putnam’s insights about truth
via metamathematical models based on capturing scientific inquiry
rather than arithmetic. Part II of Chapter 3 presents Weinstein’s
Model of Emerging Truth (MET). While typical of the dense going
of formalism, Weinstein helpfully intersperses the formalism with
scholia, paragraphs that in his words “explain or amplify the
formalism.” The general gist of the formalism is to define a
sequence of models, ordered in time, based not on a logical
consequence relation, but a weaker explanation-like relation. While
truth in a model is standard, Weinstein claims the more relevant
features of the overarching structure are the features of the
sequences of models. Very roughly, the ordering of the models is
meant to capture the breadth, depth, and consilience of the theories
the models represent. The ordering will generate a “best” theory, T,
with a “best” ontology, O*, from which a fairly standard Tarskian
truth predicate can be defined: “s is true” for s in T and T in
scientific structure TT, iff O*||-s (p. 100). But, “the truth condition
for the various theories T, of TT, that is to say O*, cannot be
ascertained independently of the history of TT, but grows out of the
progressive nature of TT” (p. 101).
In Chapter 4, Weinstein uses the MET to ground a theory of
warrant strength. In particular, taking the generalizations contained
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in the ordered realizations of theories modeled in MET as warrants,
He proposes to determine the strength of a warrant in terms of the
embeddedness of the warrrant within the ordering of models. In
this way he hopes to account for a more nuanaced view of
contradiction and how we maintain generalizations even in the
light of counter-instances. Briefly, counter-instances that are not
themselves supported by warrants at least as deeply embedded as
the generalizations they challenge are rationally resisted. In the
latter setions of the chapter, Weinstein shows how this can be done
by amalgamating his MET with a modified adaptive logic of
Christian Straßer and Dunja Seselja. An elaboration of this
amalgamation is done in Part V via Weinstein’s discussion of
Staßer and Seselja’s example of the continental drift debate of the
1920s (which in this context also serves as an example of the
application of MET to a substantive debate).
Chapter 5 is devoted to connecting the MET to empirical
instances in order to show that the theoretical framework is not
empty. The primary example is the development of the peridoic
table. Of course showing that the inquiry that leads to the periodic
table matches the MET should be no surprise since it is that inquiry
that motivated Weinstein’s development of the MET. But in the
latter half of the chapter, Weinstein presents a “metaphoric
extension of the logical metaphor that is the MET,” (p. 158) to
legal, ethical, and political argument “to indicate the possibility of
applying the core concepts of the MET across the spectrum [of
argument cultures]” (p. 179).
One of the apparent consequnces of Chapter 5, was that the
adequate evaluation of arguments requires understanding the larger
frameworks within which particular arguments are made. What
then are the implications for critical thinking and informal logic?
Chapter 6, while on the one hand a tracing out of some of the
implications of Weinstein’s work for critical thinking, informal
logic, and argumentation theory (and the teaching of critical
thinking to undergraduates), is mostly devoted to discussions of the
motivations and insights that led Weinstein towards the MET (as
but one possible way to encapsulate those insights) (p. 200).
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Hence, much of the chapter recapitulates much of Weinstein’s
earlier work arguing for an “applied epistemology” focus for
critical thinking and informal logic and could almost be read first
as a foundation for the previous five chapters.
2. Observations
Those familiar with Weinstein’s work will recognize many of the
arguments and themes of his papers and presentations from the last
three decades. Weinstein’s hope is that in this book “others see my
work,…, as a unified whole” (p. 214). Given the usual dense and
wide-ranging nature of Weinstein’s papers and talks, it is a benefit
to see what Weinstein himself calls the “fragments” connected in a
mostly unified package. Of course, given three decades of scope,
there are tensions within the text. I give four interconnected
examples. Firstly, there is an unresolved balancing act between the
judgments of the experts in a field determining such things as the
appropriateness of approximations within the model framework,
and the resulting model complexes being normative constraints on
the judgments of experts in the field. This is related to a second
tension between the pragmatics and the formalism. Those who are
leary of formalism’s role in argumentation theory are unlikely to be
assuaged by Weinstein’s account, and those who treat formalism
seriously are likely to be concerned by the appeal to intuitive
judgments to ground the formalism—for example, resolving ties in
competing warrant strength is a pragmatic decision (p 126). In
general, one might worry about the degree to which our parochial
decisions underpin the normativity of the models versus the alleged
objectivity of the resulting model complexes acting as a constraint
on what counts as a “good” judgment.
Thirdly, despite early attempts to eschew acceptability in
favor of at least an emergent truth, later chapters seem to fall back
on acceptability. For example, Weinstein writes: “to indicate a
logical structure for acceptability that, at the limit, is as true as we
can ever hope for” (p. 147). Indeed, we might wonder whether
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what Weinstein calls scientific truth or TT-truth is also subject to
the open question that Weinstein, in Chapter 1, poses as a problem
for acceptability—yes s is satisfied by the complex of models that
constitute the ontology of TT, but is it true? Finally, there is a
tension between how the model is supposed to be applicable from
science to politics (in that sense it is a general account of
argumentation) and yet it also be the case that “restricted principles
from within the disciplines, order and inform the understanding of
substantial arguments more effectively than do many of the more
abstract analyses common in informal logic” (p. 203).
Given the ambitious and broad-ranging project Weinstein
undertakes, it is also unsurprising that there are unresolved
questions about the consequences of his views. For example, what
is the upshot for argument cogency? Is it that we really cannot
determine argument cogency without a whole lot more background
analysis than is usually available? On the one hand one may be
skeptical of this result since we do seem to make local judgments
of adequacy—in the face of dubious or even obviously false
premises, or clearly insufficient reasons we are right to reject (or at
least abstain from) certain propositions, views, theories, etc. But on
the other hand, if Weinstein is correct, then there is a worry that we
will not be able to adequately assess arguments without being
experts in the domain of use and given the desire to prepare
students (and ourselves) to be able to assess a wide variety of
arguments from a plethora of domains, without being experts in all
these domains. Also, Weinstein presents an idealized, well-behaved
model of inquiry. Model chains are added to over time in a nice
neat fashion. But one might wonder how chains or parts of chains
are redacted in a scientific structure. Put another way, the ideal
model may give us a way to see emerging “truth,” but how does it
capture or represent what is rejected or taken to be false? In
standard model-theoretic constructions of possible worlds for
example, falsehood is just absence from the world. But in
Weinstein’s proposal we are comparing complexes of models over
time. Hence, it may just be that all (relevant) model chains are
considered—it is just the ones that will be “rejected” as false will
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be the ones that are not as deeply embedded and interconnected
with what inquiry reveals as the most “virtuous” model complex.
Weinstein is not unaware of many of these tensions and
unresolved questions, but these just point the way to future
research. For example, he writes: “My use of intuitive, oversimplified and idealized metamathematical constructs should be
seen as an invitation to others to extend and correct the basic
insight through mathematical constructions that more adequately
describe the model relations in chains of models for particular
aspects of signifincant inquiry” (p. 95). Given his own view, the
inquiry required for the filling in of the details of the model or, say,
the details of the relationship between the generality of Weinstein’s
proposal and the reliance on discipline specific norms could easily
engender significant shifts in the overall structure of the resulting
theory. (Though if Weinstein is correct, even these shifts would
still vindicate the underlying intution of his model of inquiry.) For
example, how general the standards are (even if the model used to
measure the standards in the various disciplines is roughly the
same) may depend upon the outcome of the possibility of a TOE
(theory of everything) in which the model networks will be
connected to each other in ways that allow for univocal assessment
of the strength of warrants, or whether the networks will only be
connected in a way that allows for discipline specific evaluations of
arguments and warrant strengths. Either outcome is consistent with
Weinstein’s proposal.
One should not construe my raising of these tensions and
questions within Weinstein’s work as refutations of its worth, but
rather goads for continued refinement.
There are many intriguing, even if controversial, proposals
and arguments that warrant argumentation theorists’ interest and
deep consideration. For example, the radical, yet intriguing view
that “truth is seen as a field property rather than a relation between
a proposition and a state of affairs” (p. 2); or that argumentation
theory need not eschew formal models and yet can still capture the
dynamics of argument and inquiry rather than just some static
absolute truth; or that a shift in focus away from commonsense
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everyday argument to the more rigouros, but still less than
absolutely certain, domain of scientific inquiry as the basis for a
theory of argumentation is merited—after all, if we are interested
in improving the reasoning of others why focus on how people in
fact argue everyday rather than on the more demanding and selfcorrective practice of scientific inquiry? But perhaps the most
promising proposal is the view of Chapters 3 and 4 that warrant
strength can be measured in the MET. If true, then a means of
comparing the respective weight of competing arguments is
possible and may help resolve the dialectical tier issue of how
much defending against objections an arguer is obligated to
perform.
My brief observations barely scratch the surface of the deep,
broad-ranging, and challenging discussions in Weinstein’s book.
An unabshed foray into the foundations of argumentation theory
(and inquiry in general), along with unreserved metamathematical
modelling makes Logic, Truth and Inquiry not for the faint of
heart. But argument and inquiry are extremely complex
phenomena, so we should expect attempts to elucidate them to be
equally complex. The diligent reader, however, will be rewarded
by the rich and fruitful position Weinstein lays out—a position that
needs consideration by a broad spectrum of argumentation
theorists.
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